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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - NO ACTION TO
HUSBAND FOR WIFE'S PERSONAL INJURIES
The wife of the plaintiff had been seriously and permanently
injured when struck by an automobile. The wife then sued and
recovered judgment for $8,500.00. Included in this sum was
$1,300.00 for medical expenses made necessary by the accident. The
wife's mental condition was such that a committee had to be ap-
pointed for her and this entire fund was placed in the hands of the
committee. The husband, plaintiff in the present action, had per-
sonally contracted the debt for the medical services to his wife and
had paid approximately $1,000.00 of this debt. He then sought
reimbursement from the fund recovered by the wife and now in the
hands of the committee. The trial court disallowed this claim and
on appeal, held, affirmed. The statute, abolishing the action of the
husband for a wife's personal injuries was said to be controlling.
Floyd v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S. E. 2d 114 (1950). Hudgins,
C. J., and Gregory, Staples JJ., dissenting.
The husband's duty to support his wife, and the wife's duty
to render services to the husband are two of the most ancient con-
cepts of the common law.2 Together with this support of the wife,
it is the duty of the husband to provide the wife necessaries accord-
ing to his station in life. Reasonable medical expenses have been
universally recognized to fall within the classification of necessaries
and the husband has no choice but to pay such expenses.3
Prior to the enactment of what is commonly called the Married
Woman's Act, the wife had no right of action against a third party
for injuries sustained by her, nor for loss of time, services or ex-
penses incurred due to the negligence of a third party. That right
of action belonged to the husband.4 In the revision of the Code of
19195 the right of the husband to sue for loss of domestic services
of the wife and was taken fromhim and given to the wife. In 19326
the section was further amended so as to broaden its scope and it
now reads: "In an action by a married woman to recover for a
personal injury inflicted on her, she may recover the entire damage
sustained including the personal injury, expenses arising out of the
injury (whether chargeable to her or her husband) notwithstanding
the husband may be entitled to the benefit of her services about
domestic affairs and consortium; and no action for such injury,
expenses or loss of services or consortium, shall be maintained by
the husband."7
The majority of the court interpreted this "no action" clause
to mean that the husband could bring no action whatsoever against
the wife as well as no action against the tort-feasor. The plaintiff
contended, to no avail, that such interpretation which would prevent
his reimbursement is a denial of due process. If the plaintiff had
a cause of action which arose prior to the amendment of 1932, this
would constitute a vested property right and it is well settled that
such property rights cannot be taken away by legislative enactment
without it being a denial of due process.8 Since the husband had
this property right prior to the enactment of the amendment, it must
be said to affect only his form of action and not his right. Where
a statute is ambigious and open to more than one interpretation, one
of which will render it void and another which will render it
valid, then the latter construction which sustains its validity must
be adopted.9 It is submitted that the interpretation which allows
the wife to recover for the benefit of the husband is the only valid
interpretation.
The recovery by the wife adds to her own separate estate and
the court leaned heavily on the portion of the Virginia Codexo pro-
viding ".... nor shall the property of the wife be subject to the debts
or liabilities of the husband." The court added that to allow the
husband any action "would amount to judicial legislation and not
interpretation." Here the husband had no choice but to pay the
medical expenses. The wife recovered an equal amount from the
tort-feasor, thus amounting to a double payment of these expenses.
As pointed out by the dissent the practical effect is to allow the wife
to recover from the husband for the negligence of a third party.
Since the husband has no choice in the matter, to deny him reim-
bursement is to place him in a position less advantageous than of
a stranger." It is submitted that the court's interpretation, which
is in violation of natural justice, is contrary to the cannon of
construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed.
The statute in question says in effect that the property of the
wife shall not be liable for the debts of the husband and it is
conceded that such medical expenses do constitute a debt of the
husband. However can it be said that all of the proceeds of this
recovery by the wife constitute property of the wife? To deny
reimbursement to the husband is to allow a double recovery to the
wife - a situation not consonant with good reason. The purpose
of recovery of medical expenses is to make whole the injured party.
Here the wife is being made more than whole at the expense of the
husband. If this were not a situation of husband and wife, it is
a typical situation for the enforcement of a resulting trust. In
view of his common law liability, the husband cannot be said to be
a volunteer. However the court says that sustaining such an
argument would require judicial legislation instead of judicial
interpretation. It is submitted that strict interpretation in the light
of natural justice and past legislative history does not amount to
judicial legislation.
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